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Introduction
The aim of this paper is to further our understanding of the relationship between job loss and family well-being. Specifically, we focus on the impact of job loss on family dissolution. Job loss leads to lower earnings and the stress from the negative income shock may increase the probability of family dissolution. Alternatively, job loss may signal an individual trait that impacts negatively on future earnings or on the quality of the match more generally. Again this suggests a positive relationship between divorce and job displacements. While policies aimed at reducing the earnings' shock from job losses may alleviate the former problem, they will be less effective if the latter impact is the main one.
In recent decades, family and marriage characteristics have dramatically changed, divorce rate has risen and marriage rates have fallen. Fertility has declined and longevity has increased and cohabitation has emerged as an important institution, sometimes as a substitute for marriage.
Families have become more heterogeneous and less stable and economic theory seeks to explain these changes, using models that also explain why people marry and remain together.
These models usually consider production complementarities and household specialization but recent works in family economics have shown that these traditional notions need to be reconceived, in order to include motivations such as consumption complementarities and insurance, as central to marriage 3 .
The economic approach to the marriage is based on the assumption that couples marry and stay married when the gains from marriage are greater than the gains from being single.
According to the traditional models of household economics 4 , starting from Gary Becker's Treatise on Family, these gains mostly come from gender specialization (especially regarding raising children), sector-specific investments in human capital and family utility maximization.
Nevertheless, many important changes in tastes and technology have affected marriage market in the last decades. Reduced market discrimination against women and household technology advances have increased female labour force participation and the technology of birth control has improved control over fertility, changing the time of marriage and births and facilitating women's accumulation of human capital.
This implies that returns to specialization in the household fall and, according to the traditional theory, the opportunity cost of marriage falls. Women with specialized market skills seem less likely to gain from marriage and therefore less likely to marry. The assumption that there are two 4 activities -home and market-and that husbands' and wives' time inputs are perfect substitutes to household production is crucial to Becker's specialisation results. Nevertheless, Lundberg (2005) points out that if household production involves many activities requiring different skills and, for example, mums and dads make distinct contributions to childrearing, then home-market segregation of sexes and gender specialization become less compelling.
If both partners are working, most of the gains from marriage may not arise from specialization and division of labour, but instead from joint consumption, consumption complementarities and from positive match between husband's and wife's preferences.
The concept of match quality and the optimal matching in the marriage market have dramatically changed. Therefore, we expect this to increase the pairing of people with similar income and interests (see Lam, 1988) .
Another complementarity arises from insurance benefits. Woman's increased labour supply may increase the benefits from risk sharing and people may marry partners whose labour income risk is negatively correlated (or uncorrelated) with their own 5 .
In this framework, the analysis of the correlation between job loss and family dissolution looks particularly appropriate. Unexpected changes in partners' characteristics may induce to reconsider the match quality and benefits arising from marriage.
Given the increased complexity of marriage relationships, individuals are far more likely to spend more time searching for a good match on the marriage market and to re-evaluate the benefits from the marriage more frequently. Women with developed labour market skills are more likely to evaluate their partner's characteristics, in terms of earning perspectives and personality traits, and job loss can affect both the value of marriage (compared to its alternatives) and the individuals' willingness and ability to make long term commitments. Gould and Paserman (2003) argue that increasing wage inequality has a direct impact on marriage, raising the importance of "searching for Mr. Right" and increasing the returns to further search and the option value of remaining single.
Husband's job loss may have a similar impact: it can be a signal of lower future earning profiles and other undesirable partner's characteristics and this may increase the option value of being unmarried, especially if the wife is working or has a strong labour market experience and there are no children in the household.
Nevertheless, it is essential to understand the reasons of the job loss and the information that this event may convey regarding the partner's suitability. An involuntary displacement (e.g. due to a plant closure) certainly causes an income shock, but is less likely to convey new information about 5 partner's personality. On the other hand, a "person-specific" dismissal is more likely to be caused by individual's characteristics and behaviour.
Current income shock may be less important for double-earners couples, while partner's personality traits are likely to have the strongest impact.
It is generally found that an experience of unemployment increases the chances of future unemployment and conveys a signal to future potential employers, who may use this information to sort good an bad workers 6 .
Similar mechanisms can apply to marriage market, both because of a lower earning perspective (that will affect family's future economic well-being) and because of the signal about partner's characteristics and personality traits. All these factors are likely to reduce the attractiveness of marriage.
The finding of significant effects of job loss on the probability of divorce has important consequences for the modelling of the impacts of displacement on families generally. Studies of the effect of job loss on family consumption or labour supply that only consider couples who remain married will produce biased results since those couples who remain married are those who had to face the fewest adjustments as a consequence of job loss. Excluding divorced couples is likely to lead to an underestimate of the impact of job displacement 7 .
Identifying the causal effect of job displacement on family dissolution is complicated by the possible endogeneity of job loss. Reverse causality (the increased likelihood of job loss due to the imminent breakdown of the partnership) could be reduced by controlling for the relative timing of the events. A second source of endogeneity bias is the omission of important variables; the probability of job loss and divorce could be correlated due to a common trait of the individual or family not observed in the data. This relates back to the channels of transmission mentioned earlier 8 and is a serious concern for this topic. Furthermore, panel data techniques are unlikely to resolve this problem through the modelling of individual-specific unobserved effects since events considered here (divorce and job loss) occur fairly rarely. Estimating or controlling for unobserved characteristics which make some individuals more prone to job loss and divorce is not feasible with standard models and datasets when the events happen very rarely.
To identify exogenous variations in the occurrence of job loss, recent studies have made use of information on the type of displacement. While one would expect a dismissal to be correlated with individual attributes that also influence the probability of divorce, a job loss due to a plant closure is unlikely to suffer from this problem. This approach follows earlier studies analysing the effects 6 of job displacements on future earnings (for example see Gibbons and Katz (1991) for US data and Doiron (1995) for Canadian evidence).
In this paper we use data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) to analyse the causal effect of job loss on the probability of divorce. Marriage is defined broadly to include cohabitation and divorce includes separation. Panel data allow the inclusion of controls for match quality (years of marriage and age at marriage date). Panel data models are used to control for match specific and time invariant unobserved effects. Information on reasons for terminating the employment spell is used to distinguish between different types of job changes. While dismissals are more likely to be correlated with relevant omitted variables, redundancies are based on the characteristics and the environment of the employer. Furthermore, using information on the workforce growth rate by industry, we identify redundancies occurring in declining industries. These are treated as exogenous job losses. Lastly, we control for a large set of individual and family characteristics and we restrict attention to job losses experienced by the husband.
We find evidence that a husband's job loss has a significant positive impact on the probability of divorce in the following year. Both types of job losses considered -redundancies and dismissalshave significant and positive effects on marriage dissolution. However, the effect from redundancies is smaller. The effect from redundancies captures the negative income shock and may convey some information on the partner's future earning capabilities, while dismissals represent both a current income shock and a signal regarding partner's quality (including, but not limited, to the future earning profile). Our results are confirmed, even comparing two smaller samples, different by marriage date.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the existing literature. In Section 3 we present theoretical frameworks underlying the economic analyses of marriage and divorce. Section 4 includes a description of the data construction and Section 5 presents descriptive characteristics of the analysis sample. Section 6 discusses the empirical model and Section 7 presents the empirical results. Finally Section 8 contains concluding comments. 7
Overview of existing literature
Job loss has a strong impact on many economic channels that may influence family well-being.
First of all, job loss has a direct impact on family income and causes an income shock to the whole family. The economic literature has traditionally considered the impact of earnings' shocks on family well-being, focusing on the consumption or production side and mostly analysing couples that remain together after these shocks (see for example Browning and Crossley, 2001 and Collen and Gruber, 2000) . There is now a well-established body of work showing the effects of job displacement on re-employment probabilities and future earning. Displaced workers tend to experience reduced employment possibilities, increased job instability, as well as lower earnings' profiles (Ruhm, 1991; Jacobsen, Lalonde and Sullivan, 1993; and Chan and Stevens, 2001) .
Second, job loss may affect family members other than the individual who directly experiences the displacement. There are a growing number of studies on the effects of job loss on other members of the family. For example see Stephens (2001) for an analysis of family consumption changes after the husband's job loss; also Ercolani and Jenkins (1999) and Stephens (2004) for studies of wives' labour supply changes in response to the husband's job loss. Most of these studies analyse responses in the family's choice of consumption of both leisure and market-produced goods.
Models of family utility maximization suggest that reduced family income due to the earnings losses of one family member may be offset by increases in the labour supply of others. These studies show a significant impact of job losses on families' behaviours, both in terms of consumption and labour supply.
Social science literature 9 has addressed some of these issues in the last two decades, especially focusing on the relationship between parental job loss and children well-being. Job loss negatively affects family's economic security, and this reflects in decreased expenditure in goods that are critical for children development 10 (i.e. food, school, housing, learning environment). Further, an increased relying on public assistance has been found to have detrimental effect on children's cognitive achievements 11 and the "family stress" is likely to affect parents-children relationships and children emotional development. Lastly, children's observations of their parents' work 8 experiences can affect their own views of their future economic opportunities and this may have a negative effect on attitudes and achievements.
Third, changes in family labour supply and consumption form only part of the impact of job loss and the shocks in earnings' levels. These events are also important in affecting the level of health and subjective well-being of the family. Recent work shows substantial impacts of unemployment on mental and physical health and well-being generally. There is a large empirical psychological literature 12 investigating the impact of unemployment on the incidence of low life satisfaction, depression, low self-esteem, unhappiness, and even suicide. The negative income shock is but one source of these effects as employment is also a provider of social relationships, identity in society and individual self esteem (Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998) .
A British study by Clark and Oswald (1994) uses cross sectional data from the first wave of the BHPS to test whether unemployed people are relatively happy or unhappy. Their results show that unemployed people have much lower levels of mental well being than those in work. Moreover, a recent study from Sullivan and von Watcher (2006) investigates the impact of mass layoffs on mortality. Their results show that the relationship between job loss and mortality follows a U shape; mortality rates are particularly high in the years following a job loss and after a prolonged period of time. This is consistent with an initial increase in mortality from acute stress and a longer term rise from the chronic stress resulting from permanently lower average earnings.
Di Tella et al (2003) focus on psychic losses from recessions and underline that an increase in joblessness can affect well-being through at least two channels. One is the direct effect from unemployment to individual unhappiness, and the second one is that, perhaps because of fear, a rise in the unemployment rate may reduce well-being even among those who are in work or looking after the home. This study shows that losses from recessions are larger than the GDP decline and the rise in personal unemployment.
The impact of unemployment on spousal well-being has been rarely analysed in economic literature. There is a small body of psychological literature (see Strom, 2003 for a review) showing that there is a significant negative effect of men's unemployment on women mental health, sometimes mediated through the effects on men's health. Clark (1999) and Clark (2003) show that "unemployment of relevant others (individual's partner or other adults in the household) hurts for people in employment" 13 .
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The negative stress and decreased psychological well being (both for the individual and his partner) arising form a job loss may cause stress to the marriage and therefore increase the occurrence of family conflicts.
Yet another dimension of the impact of job losses and earnings' shocks generally is the potential adjustment in terms of family composition. Number of children and presence of a partner are generally treated as exogenous family characteristics in studies of consumption and labour supply but serious shocks such as involuntary job losses could affect decisions regarding fertility and marriage. These non-pecuniary adjustments cannot be regarded as being of secondary importance; divorce is ranked as the most stressful of life events except for death of a family member. 14 Nevertheless, there are but a few studies to date on this aspect of the costs of negative earnings' shocks and job displacements.
Social sciences literature 15 has addressed the relationship between unemployment and family wellbeing, but few attention has been devoted to the possible job loss endogeneity and to the causal mechanism and panel data have rarely been used for these studies.
Economic literature to date on is quite limited and provides contradictory evidence and results. Jensen and Smith (1990) analyse separately the effects of job losses occurring in the recent past from those occurring earlier. The results based on Danish panel data suggest that the only significant effect on divorce is from current unemployment and job losses occurring one or two years earlier have no impact. These findings raise concerns that reverse causality may be driving the earlier findings of significant effects of job losses. Weiss and Willis (1997) use US data from the National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 to study the effects of earnings shocks on the probability of divorce. Shocks or "surprises" are defined as the difference between realized and predicted earnings estimated from earning regressions. They show that a positive surprise to a husband's earnings lowers the probability of marriage dissolution, while a positive shock in wife's earnings raises the chance of divorce. These results are robust to the inclusion of several controls for match quality.
More recent studies use more direct measures of earnings' shocks. For example, based on the German Socio-economic Panel data, Kraft (2001) analyses the impact of unemployment on married couples' decision to separate. The husband's unemployment is found to increase the risk of separation in the following year and this impact increases with the duration of unemployment.
Wives' unemployment does not seem to have the same effect.
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Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Charles and Stephens (2004) find an increase in the probability of divorce following a spouse's job displacement but this increase is found only for layoffs and not for plant closures. As Charles and Stephens (2004) state "[…] This suggests that information conveyed about a partner's non-economic suitability as a mate due to a job loss may be more important than the financial losses in precipitating a divorce." In comparison, Eliason (2004) finds a significant negative impact on the marriage's stability caused by the husband's or the wife's job displacement due to a factory closure in Sweden. Hence existing results are few, and to date, contradictory.
This paper tries to add to the different strands of literature mentioned above in different ways. First of all, we deal with the possible endogeneity of job loss, focusing on involuntary displacements and showing that our results are stable across different models and different samples.
Second, we try to investigate multiple transmission channels of job loss negative effect, in order to recognize the income shock and the signalling role, by distinguishing different job losses and by analysing differences in impact size.
Lastly, we check our results using different samples, also including couples who have been married for longer periods and may have idiosyncratically higher levels of durability.
Economic models of marriage and marriage stability
In this section, we briefly discuss the main theoretical frameworks used in the economic analysis of marriage and marriage stability. Although we focus on economic models, it is clear that economic considerations form but part of the picture and as stated by Weiss and Willis (1997) : "A successful theory which is capable of explaining the data on marriage and divorce must incorporate ideas from sociology, biology and other fields". Nonetheless, as summarized below, economic factors have been shown to play a significant role in the decisions to form and dissolve households.
Three decades have passed since Becker's first seminal work (1973, 1974) Similarly, the decision to divorce is based on the expected utility maximisation process and two individuals divorce when the expected utility of remaining married is less than the expected utility of divorce. The expected utility of divorce includes the probability of remarriage as well as the costs of divorce and the expected utility of remaining married includes the future option of divorce.
As long as they are married, the two individuals maximise a joint utility function, whose arguments are the income or labour earnings received by each spouse 17 . In every period each partner has an alternative utility option, which he or she can receive when not married. The couple divorces when the joint expected utility of being married is less than the sum of the individual expected utility from divorce. This means that it is not enough that one of the two spouses gains from the family dissolution for the couple's decision to divorce.
The economic approach to the analysis of partnership dissolution suggests two general causes for marital instability and for a marriage to end in a divorce 18 . First, although the search for a partner is costly, meetings do occur on a random basis. As a consequence, a union may become unacceptable if one of the two partners meets a person who would be superior to the current match. Second, people enter a marriage based on expectations about the traits of the other spouse. These characteristics, which influence the gain from a union, may change over time unexpectedly and cause the spouses to reconsider their initial decision 19 . Thus "surprises", such as unexpectedly high or low income, may affect marriage dissolution. Becker, Landes and Michael (1977) underline that "the majority of divorces results from uncertainty and unfavourable outcomes".
A job loss may be considered as an economic "surprise" about the partner's future earning ability.
It could also be a significant indicator of characteristics of the partner that affect his/her suitability as a mate such as reliability or sense of responsibility. Therefore, it is new information regarding a couple's match that can be taken into account in evaluating the union stability. Eliason (2004) underlines that the traits needed to keep a job are partly the same as the traits that make a partner desirable, and a job loss may reveal new information about the match quality.
An alternative theory of divorce is the family stress theory, the ABC-X model, first elaborated by Hill (1949) and later by McCubbin and Patterson (1982) 20 . In this model, A is a stressor event, B the family's coping resources, C the family's perception of the event and X the crisis. The stressor 12 event will have an impact both on the family's coping resources and on the family's perception and can result in a crisis or a resolution. A job displacement can be considered as a stressor event. It may cause financial and psychological stress and have broad implications on health and social networks for both the person experiencing the job loss and the other members of the family 21 .
Game theoretic models of family bargaining offer alternatives to unitary models, where household members maximize the altruistic utility, subject to resources' and technology constraints.
In the first family bargaining models, the "divorce threat models", (see Manser and Brown,1980 and McElroy and Horney,1981) bargaining power depends on the expected utility outside the marriage. In contrast, Lundberg and Pollak (1993) propose a "separate spheres" model, assuming that both partners behave noncooperatively and treat divorce as an outside option.
Game theoretic models of family bargaining can be useful to analyse family dissolution when bargaining power or external options suddenly change, as following a job loss.
In a recent study, Matouschek and Rasul (2004) develop stylised models of marriage as an exclusive contract. At the beginning of the first period each man is matched with one woman and each couple receives a signal about the future gains from being together. After observing the signal, each couple then decides whether to break up, cohabit or get married. If the couple decides to get married each partner immediately realizes an exogenous 'marriage bonus', that represents the extra utility that the partners gain from publicly demonstrating their commitment to each other. In some variations of this approach, couples are involved in an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. After learning about the potential benefits that can be realised in the relationship, the partners decide simultaneously whether to cooperate or not. Marriage is a commitment device that fosters cooperation.
In this setting, job loss can be interpreted as a factor that modifies the signal received by the partners. A partner's job loss reduces the benefits of remaining together and may eventually cause the benefits from marriage to be lower than the expected payoffs of returning to the single pool.
Moreover, the partner's job loss may modify the information or beliefs about his/her true commitment in the relationship.
In all these models, job displacement plays a natural role in explaining marriage dissolution.
Furthermore, several channels of transmission are expected. A job loss can create an immediate earnings' shock that reduces the relative benefits of marriage/cohabitation and imposes pecuniary and non-pecuniary stress on the relationship. It also has longer-term effects both in terms of the future monetary benefits of the relationship and as an indicator of other determinants of the expected value of the match. The decision of limiting the sample to people in paid employment is driven by the fact that job loss can only occur to these individuals, and not to self employed, unemployed or individuals out of the labour force for other reasons.
Data construction: sample and variables
A complete dataset, containing all family histories in the BHPS is available together with the BHPS original data. This dataset contains a consolidated marital, cohabitation and fertility history for 29,065 adults, interviewed at least once during the survey. This dataset allows us to distinguish marriage and cohabitations, and also provides the starting and end date of each union. If the union is a marriage, either partner can die, they can get divorced, separated or they can live together. If the union is a cohabitation, the partners can split, get married or they can continue cohabitating.
In this analysis, we do not distinguish between marriages and cohabitations. If the two partners cohabitate before marriage, we consider the cohabitation starting date as the union starting date.
We would ideally like to know the date at which individuals felt their marriage end, regardless of the legal date of divorce or separation. If there is a separation before the divorce, the date of separation is considered as the union end date.
We define a divorce binary variable, that is equal to 1 when the end date from the family data set indicates a separation, a divorce or a split (for cohabitating partners) and when this is the last time the couple is observed being together in the survey. Usually, this can be easily been confirmed by subsequent observations in consecutives waves. There is a very small number of individuals 23 who disappear from the survey for a limited number of years (when still married or cohabitating) and then re-appear with a different marital status (divorced or separated). For these couples, we assume they separate in the first year we don't observe them in the survey 24 .
If a union ends, the partners are subsequently dropped from the analysis sample.
We don't restrict the attention to individuals who were married in 1991, but we include marriages starting during the survey. We also include second and later marriages. Then, we check our results comparing two samples of people married before the beginning of the survey (older cohorts, who have been married for a longer number of years) and people married after the beginning of the BHPS (younger cohorts, who have been married for a shorter period). The underlying idea is to check the stability of our results, comparing families with different characteristics. Particularly, it is interesting to observe the effect of job loss on family dissolution, looking at families who got married before the beginning of the survey. These couples can have idiosyncratically higher levels of durability and, if we find that job loss increases the probability of divorce, even in families which are idiosyncratically stable, then our results are likely to have conservative lower bounds for the population at large.
Information on labour market behaviour and periods of unemployment is collected in different sources within the BHPS. At each interview, the individual is asked about his/her current employment situation 25 , and whether he/she did any paid work or was away from a job in the week prior to the interview. Retrospective information about labour force behaviour and all employment spells over the previous year is also collected. G. Paull has compiled a special data set containing labour forces spells (defined in terms of spell state, start date and end date) for each individual after leaving fulltime education until the time of the interview 26 . This data set is complete for the first 11 waves of the BHPS and reconciles multiple sources of information on employment spells.
Information on the reason for leaving an employment spell is not included in the Paull data set and was derived from the job history files. When providing the reason for leaving a job, individuals can choose among the following alternatives: promoted, left for better job, made redundant, dismissed or sacked, temporary job ended, took retirement, stopped for health reasons, left to have a baby, 23 Around 25 couples. 24 A sensitivity analysis is conducted by constructing a binary variable for couples who disappear from the survey for some years. This variable is introduced in all our models and does not affect the sign and significance of job loss variables. Results are available on request. 25 The proposed alternatives are: self employed, in-paid employment (full time or part time), unemployed, retired from paid work, on maternity leave, looking after family or home, full time student/at school, long term sick or disabled, on a government training scheme, something else. 26 See Paull (1997) and Paul (2002). children/home care, care of other person, and other reasons. In this paper we focus on the involuntary displacements: dismissals, redundancies and temporary job endings.
We consider job changes experienced by the male partner only. Also, we analyse only those job changes due to the following reasons: temporary job ended, redundancy, and dismissal. Dismissals are more likely to incorporate signals on the future benefits of the match. Temporary jobs as well but perhaps to a lesser extent.
Redundancy has been showed to have a lower impact on future earning profiles and to have a "less scarring" effect. Arulampalam (2001) shows that individuals who were made redundant and did not move into another job immediately are less "scarred" compared to someone else who loses his job for other reasons, ceteris paribus. These individuals are expected to earn, on average, 5% more with respect to someone who loses his job for other reason and finds employment via a spell of unemployment.
UK redundancy law allows three reasons for redundancy: total cessation of the employer's business (whether permanently or temporarily), cessation of business at the employee's workplace and reduction in the number of workers required to do a particular job. Moreover, the employment law clearly specifies that, in a redundancy situation, the employer should select workers fairly and should consider any alternatives to redundancy (this includes offering alternative work) and workers are eligible for redundancy payments after two years tenure. Therefore, the legislation is quite explicit and the term redundancy should not refer to a dismissal caused by individual worker's behaviour. Nevertheless, redundancy is a commonly accepted term for involuntary separation and respondents may be willing to report redundancies in cases of dismissals 27 .
Consequently, a more stringent definition of redundancy is constructed using information on the industry of the job just ended. Specifically, data on industry-specific workforce growth rates was collected from published UK government statistics and a three years moving average growth rate for each industry was constructed. Redundancies from jobs in industries with declining employment are treated separately and are considered as exogenous job displacements 28 . 
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Other variables included are: highest educational qualification attained (Degree, HND/A 29 level, O/CSE 30 , No qualification), number of children and age of the youngest child in the household, age, years of marriage, a binary indicator of woman employment status 31 and two match quality characteristics.
The economic literature related to marriage and divorce underlines the importance of "good matches" among partners. Couples are characterised by their "match quality" at the start of the relationship and this is an important predictor of the future stability of their union. Factors such as similar life experiences and goals can affect the intensity of the initial connection and hence help determine the probability of a stable marriage. We include information about difference in age between partners and similarities in education.
In the second specification of our model, we also control for an indicator of long term unemployment, repeated job loss and both partners' age at marriage. 
Descriptive statistics
This section presents some descriptive statistics of the sample, with a focus on the relationship between job loss and marital dissolution.
The final sample contains about 6,100 couples and 32,500 observations. Figure 1 displays the divorce/separation rate in percentage across the 14 waves, for couples who are in the analysis sample. From these raw figures, we can see that on average about 2% of the marriages and cohabitations are dissolved by divorce or separation each year and the incidence of dissolution trends downwards over the length of the union. There isn't a significant higher divorce rate for couples with husband's job loss experience (around 1,275 couples). 5,00% 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3
Figure 1 -Divorce rate in the analysis sample

Job loss sample No job loss sample
Note: The data is based on the unbalanced sample, of all couples with man aged 16-65 in paid employment.
Tables 1, 2 and 3 present the number of job losses in the analysis sample. There is a limited incidence of repeated job loss in the same year. The incidence of redundancy decreases over the 14 waves from 6.24% in 1991 to 1.25% in 2004. There is a significantly higher percentage of redundancy, with respect to the number of dismissals and temporary job endings. Figure 2 presents the distribution of length of marriages/cohabitation in the sample, by job loss experience. On average, the percentage of partners who have been together for relatively short periods (less than 10 years) is higher in both samples and especially among couples who don't have a job loss experience. This shows that the differences between the two groups are not merely due to sampling issues and that couples with job loss experience don't have idiosyncratically lower levels of durability. In other words, looking at these figures , we cannot claim that job losers' families are just bad matches, that fail quicker than the others because of partners' or couples' characteristics. 14,00% 0 1 2 3 4 5 -7 8 -1 0 1 1 -1 5 1 6 -2 0 2 1 -2 5 2 6 -3 0 3 1 -3 5 3 6 -4 0 4 1 -4 5
Figure 2 -Distribution of years of marriage
No JL sample JL sample Note: The data is based on the unbalanced sample, of all couples with man aged 16-65 in paid employment. Table 4 presents differences in demographic and socio-economic variables among couples with and without job loss experience. Couples without any job loss experience are slightly older on average and at the time of marriage. However, these differences are fairly small as is the difference in the number of children. There is a higher percentage of young children (age 0-4) among families with a job loss experience.
A more noticeable difference is found in education levels. Table 4 shows that there is a significantly greater percentage of people with higher qualifications among couples with no job losses. This is true for both men and women. Nearly 61% of men without any job loss experience hold a high degree or a A level, compared to 53% in the sample with displacements. Table 4 also presents differences in income. In order to avoid the problem of reverse causality (where a marriage dissolution causes an income shock), we use the lagged household income and current non labour income. Overall, the percentage of people with low household income (less than £20,000) is higher in the sample with a job loss, while differences in non labour income are not very significant. This can partially be explained by the higher percentage of women in the labour force (either in paid employment or self employed) in the sample of couples with no job loss experience. Table 4 summarizes the differences in age and education level across partners. Overall, 42% of partners among couples who experience a job loss have the same level of educational qualifications. This proportion increases to 45% among couples without any job losses.
There is a lower percentage of married versus cohabitating partners in the job loss sample, where differences in age are slightly higher.
Estimation methods
In this paper panel data methods are used in order to control for match specific unobserved heterogeneity as well as the observed heterogeneity captured by the explanatory factors.
Specifically, a random effects probit model is used:
where Y* it is a latent variable measuring the net benefits of family dissolution; x is a vector of explanatory variables; N is the number of couples and T is the couple specific number of time periods in the survey. The random effects probit splits the non-deterministic component into a time invariant couple-specific term α i and an idiosyncratic error term ε it assumed to be i.i.d.
according to N(0,1).
Rather than observing Y* it , the following is observed: …..N, t=1,….T i and Y it -the dependent variable-is a binary variable with a value of 1 indicating family dissolution.
The probability of observing a divorce for individual i at time t conditional on the regressors and the individual effect is:
The maintained assumptions on the match quality term α i are that α i |x i ∼N(0,σ 2 α ), σ 2 α is independent of x, and E(α i |x i ) = E(α i ) = 0; that is, the unobserved individual effect is assumed to be independent of x i and normally distributed. (The assumption of a zero mean is innocuous as long as x includes a constant.) The assumption of independence between the observed and the unobserved determinants
0 otherwise 20 of match quality is restrictive but in the case of a probit, unrestricted match-specific effects cannot be estimated consistently nor can they be cancelled out 32 .
One way of relaxing the independence assumption is to model the relationship between x i and α i ;
this is the approach taken in the Chamberlain model. For example let α i = γ z i + ν i where γ measures the partial correlation between the observed characteristics in z and the individual-specific effect;
ν|z is N(0,σ 2 v ) and independent of x. The vector z can be a subset (or all) of the x variables and can include transformations of the x variables such as means. In our case the match quality variables (see below) are more appropriately interpreted as components of this z vector since they are timeinvariant and match-specific.
Finally, various alternative specifications are estimated in order to investigate the sensitivity of the results.
A key point of this analysis is the identification of exogenous job loss variable.
As explained above, job loss is potentially endogenous with respect to mental health for two main reasons. First of all, there could be an omitted variable bias, and unobserved individual characteristics may have an impact both on mental health and job loss.
Second, there is a risk of reverse causality as, for instance, divorced people may be more likely to be laid off.
Therefore, we try to concentrate on an exogenous source of job loss. First of all, we exploit the nature of our data and analyse the different reasons for terminating an employment spell. As already explained, UK redundancy law is quite explicit and the term redundancy should not refer to a dismissal caused by individual worker's behaviour or individual characteristics.
Therefore, in the first model, we model the probability of family dissolution with respect to a redundancy, controlling for individual's and couple's characteristics as explained above.
Nevertheless, the reason for leaving the employment spell is self reported and this may lead to potential measurement error. Our major concern is that redundancy is probably less stigmatic than being sacked/dismissed.
Consequently, we try to reduce the risk of job loss endogeneity, using a different method and then conducting a sensitivity analysis of our results.
A more stringent definition of redundancy is constructed using information on the industry of the job just ended. 33 This data is sourced from the published UK government statistics and used to 21 construct a three years moving average workforce growth rate for every industry. Then, each employment spell is linked with the relevant growth rate and redundancies from jobs in industries with declining employment are treated separately and are considered as exogenous job displacements
In the first basic model, regressors include some individual and family characteristics (i.e. lagged yearly household income, length of marriage, education level, woman's employment status) and two match quality characteristics (a binary variable indicating whether the two partners have more than 8 years difference in age and a binary variable indicating whether the two partners have the same education level). In the second model, we correct for possible job loss endogeneity, and we run a sensitivity analysis on our results, using the information about redundancy in declining industry. In model 3 and 4 we use more covariates, to check the stability of our results, and we control for: partners' age at marriage, an indicator of long term unemployment, an indicator of repeated job loss, a group of interactions between redundancy and lagged household income categories (model 3) and a group of interactions between redundancy and age of the youngest child in the household (model 4) 34 . A further test is conducted using interactions between redundancy and non labour income categories. The base model is also estimated for two special samples. The first one include couples who got married before the beginning of the survey (1991) and the second one includes younger cohorts, who got married after the beginning of the survey. All models are estimated using a pooled probit model and a random effect probit model.
Results
The estimation results from the base model are presented in cohabitating), the more time they have had to familiarize themselves with their partners' characteristics and the more time they have had to evolve strategies for dealing with them 36 . (Note that the time invariant couple specific match quality will be captured in the match quality variables and the unobserved fixed component).
With respect to the controls for observable match quality, we find that sharing the same education level does not have a significant effect on the probability of divorce. Nevertheless, the observed sign is negative and this suggests that similarity in schooling may reduce the probability of divorce.
Difference in age (greater than 8 years) between partners is not significant, but the observed sign is positive.
How a job loss is perceived by the family, and how they will adapt to this shock depends on their "coping resources" 37 . The level of income before the shock is likely to influence the perception of the severity of the income shock. A higher income could indicate more savings and a greater ability to deal with the income loss, even if it could also represent greater expectations of future income and hence greater income loss from the job displacement. In our results, the first effect is the strongest. Lagged yearly household income is significant and decrease the probability of family dissolution, even if the impact size is quite small.
The number of dependent children in the household also does not have a significant effect on the probability of divorce, but the negative sign suggests that people are less likely to dissolve their marriage the more children they have. Again, this result is consistent with traditional literature, even if it is difficult to be certain about the direction of causality here, as it may be people who are confident in the stability of their marriages are more likely to have more children.
The results on educational variables are consistent with recent findings in family economics. Less educated women (lower high school graduate) are more likely to divorce than women who hold a higher qualification. They are actually more likely to get married at younger age, spend less time in partner searching, and thus more likely to experience a bad match. It has been shown in recent works on the topic (see, for example, McLahan, 2004) that mothers with lower level of education have their children at younger age, are less likely to marry and more likely to divorce, and have lower levels of employment than highly educated mothers. Stevenson and Wolfers (2006) use data from the 2001 Survey of Income and Program Participation, to show that the higher divorce propensity among people without a degree is too large to simply reflect their early entry into marriages. Moreover, recent population surveys show that marriage rates for college-educated women have been rising over time and highly educated women are now as likely (and may 23 eventually be more likely) to marry as less educated women. Nevertheless, they tend to get married much later than do those with less education.
The base model also includes a binary indicator, equal to 1 if the female partner is active in the labour market (in paid employment or self employed). As we discussed in the introduction, on the one hand, working women are economically independent and therefore are more likely to carefully evaluate and re-evaluate benefits from marriage, increasing the divorce probability.
On the other hand, they are also more likely to spend more time searching for a good match before marriage (as we just said about women with higher education), to enter marriage at a older age and therefore are less likely to divorce. Moreover, the evaluation of partner's job loss can be different:
the income shock is likely to be less important for double-earners couples, while individual and personality traits probably have a stronger impact on family stability.
In our base model, this variable is not significant but has a positive sign.
We turn now to a discussion of the results involving the husband's job loss indicators, our main variables of interest. The results generally confirm previous findings of the existence of a positive relationship between job loss and the probability of family dissolution. Contrary to the findings of Charles and Stephens, we find an effect from all types of job losses considered here but the impact of redundancies is smaller than that from dismissals.
Job loss affects family stability through multiple transmission channels, different by the type of job loss experienced.
First of all, there is a negative income shock, (both from redundancy and dismissal) and the financial stress on the partnership is likely to increase the probability of dissolution. Furthermore, it
is not just the current income shock that matters, but also the possible information about future earning profiles and expected wages in the following employment spells.
Nevertheless, it has been shown (see Arulampalam, 2001 ) that redundancy has a lower effect on future wages and earning profiles, both because of eligibility for redundancy payment and lower effect of redundancy on new employment's wage.
Second, psychological elements, such as changes in the individual perceived role in the society and self esteem arise regardless of the income shock and because employment is also a provider of social relationship, identity in the society and individual self esteem. Again, these factors can impose stress on the relationship and may increase the probability of family dissolution. The impact of these elements is expected to be higher if the job loss can be attributed to individual's characteristics.
Lastly, job loss may convey new information regarding partner's suitability as a mate and non economic benefits from the marriage. This information is related to future realizations of important non financial variables which affect marital well-being, such irresponsibility, bad temper, discipline -traits which make a partner less desirable, irrespective of the economic situation.
This last element is essential to understand the different impact of redundancy and dismissal on the probability of family dissolution.
Since redundancy is more likely to be related to employer's characteristics, this kind of job loss does not communicate a sign of poor "match quality", as it may seem less reasonable to ascribe negative inferences about personality to any individual who has lost his job this way.
On the other hand, a dismissal is personal and it may be due to some characteristics that have led the employer to reconsider the role of that specific individual. These characteristics may be the same that lead to reconsider the quality of the marriage and the person's fitness as a marriage partner.
Therefore, the impact of redundancy on marriage stability can be attributed to:
-limited current income shock -small signal on future income -small psychological stress on both partners
On the other hand, dismissals will incorporate:
-higher income shock -stronger signal on future income -stronger psychological stress on both partners -signal on partner's personality and match quality
In the most parsimonious model, men who have been made redundant are 0.6 percentage points more likely to divorce in the following year than those without any redundancy experience. The dismissal effect is higher: couples who suffer dismissals of the husband are 2.9 percentage points more likely to divorce in the following year. Moreover, the coefficients of redundancy and dismissal are significantly different 38 .
The interpretation of the impact of a temporary job ended is less clear: on the one hand, this seems more similar to a redundancy, as the job loss is due to the precise nature of the contract irrespective of individual characteristics. On the other hand, it may convey a signal about the individual as somebody with only marginal attachment to the labour market. Also, it may be that the contract is not renewed because of the personal characteristics of the worker. The effect of the ending of a temporary job is less than a dismissal and greater than a redundancy. In the base model, the probability of divorce increases by 1.6 percentage points following the end of a temporary job. 38 p=0.07. Figure 3 presents the evolution of the predicted probability of divorce, increasing years of marriage, for couples with and without the redundancy experience. All the other independent variables are set to their means. No redundancy
Redundancy
As we have already explained, the probability of family dissolution decreases increasing the marriage length and couples who experience a redundancy are more likely to dissolve in the following year. The age at marriage of the female partner negatively affects the probability of divorce. This is consistent with the traditional argument in the theoretical literature on marital search. People who spent more time searching for a spouse are more likely to have a match of better quality. It is interesting that the coefficient on the age of marriage of the male partner although also negative is small and insignificant. The extra time spent searching does not seem to benefit male partners.
The indicator of long term unemployment is a binary variable, equal to 1 when the man experiences a redundancy and he is still unemployed in the following year. This variable is not significant in this model. 39 This confirms that the impact of job loss on family dissolution is mostly found in the short term and the duration of the unemployment spell doesn't really affect family stability. Similar results are found using an interaction between dismissal and long term unemployment.
This result is interesting from two different points of view.
First of all, it is consistent with previous literature on the effect of unemployment duration on other variables, such as earning losses on re-employment jobs. Arulampalam (2001) has shown that no significant effect of the actual spell duration was found in addition to the incidence effect.
Second, this result is consistent with the findings of Charles and Stephens (2004) , who show that the job loss effect is higher in the period immediately following the shock.
Coming back to the transmission channels of the shock, the earning's shock is likely to be stronger, if the man is still unemployed one year after the job loss.
Nevertheless, this is not a crucial element in increasing the probability of family dissolution and the duration of dismissal's or redundancy's spells does not add anything to the incidence effect.
Our guess is that it is the new information that the earning shock brings to the couple that is most likely to affect the evaluation of the future benefits of the marriage and this element is much more important than the earning shock itself.
The repeated job loss variable is a binary indicator, equal to 1 if the same individual experiences more than one job loss (redundancy, dismissal or temporary job ending) during the survey. The underlying idea is that this could show a personality trait, that it is likely to affect marriage stability. Nevertheless, the coefficient is not significant (even if it has positive sign), even if this could be partially due to the limited incidence of repeated job loss in the analysis sample.
As expected, being in the top income group reduces the probability of divorce, with respect to middle income families. 39 It is not significant in the base model either.
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The interactions between redundancy and income are significant and show that families with middle income are at a higher risk of dissolution following a redundancy. The size of the coefficient is lower than the dismissal's one, but is higher than the temporary job ending's coefficient. Redundancy experiences in the lowest income group and in the middle income (the omitted one) are significantly different 40 . Families with lower income are subject to a lower risk of dissolution after a job loss.
This result looks reasonable, considering that middle income people are subject to a higher income shock and also because some psychological elements, such as individual's self esteem and perceived role in the society may affect middle income families more strongly (mostly because of the prestige attached to husband's occupation).
On the other hand, people in the top income category are also less likely to divorce after a redundancy. Household income incorporates both labour and non labour earnings and middle income families certainly have lower extra-labour earnings than people in top income category.
Therefore they have less resources to cope with the job loss shock. Further, people in the top income distribution are likely come from high-skilled occupations (having high levels of education, but, most important, strong skills on the labour market) and it could be easier for them to find a suitable alternative in the labour market.
Further tests are conducted using interactions between current non labour income and redundancy 41 and the main results are exactly the same.
These results are consistent with recent research on the consequences of unemployment, showing that job loss is an increasing middle class phenomenon and that job seekers with college degrees have had an especially difficult time finding a new employment 42 . Again, these results should be interpreted considering the transmission channels of job loss on family stability.
Families with young children certainly have higher income shock after a redundancy, even if the presence of young kids should partially offset this negative effect and decrease the probability of dissolution. Nevertheless, the financial stress for both partners, deriving both from the current income shock and from the expectations of future income, is likely to be higher when partners also have children's responsibility.
Lastly, there could be a signalling role of the job loss (even if smaller for redundancy), that is especially important when there are children in the family, as it is possible some traits needed to keep a job, such as responsibility and reliability, are partly the same as the traits that make a partner desirable, especially in the role of a father. There are several differences between the two samples. First of all, the incidence of divorce is higher in the younger cohorts sample (around 2% versus 1% per year) and particularly high in the early years of marriage. Second, younger cohorts tend to enter marriage when they are older (34 years old for men-versus 25 in the other sample -and 32 years old for women -versus 23) and the incidence of job loss is higher among the youngest, even if the difference is not dramatic.
A more noticeable difference is found in the percentage of women out of the labour force and in education levels. Only 16% of younger women are at home, caring for their family, while this percentage is around 20% among the older cohorts. Moreover, younger women definitively are more educated (18% hold a high degree, versus 10% in the older sample) and the percentage of women with no educational qualification at all is much lower (13% versus 22%). Educational levels are different for men as well, but the differences are lower.
There are not significant differences in income distribution, even if there is a higher percentage of middle income earners among the older cohorts. As expected, there is a higher percentage of couples with very young children (0-4) among the youngest (27% versus 19%). Table 9 presents the base model, estimated on the older cohorts' sample. The sign and significance of the main variables are unchanged. All the different job losses increase the probability of family dissolution in the following year and partial effects are similar to the main results.
These results are particularly interesting because this is a smaller sample of couples that can have idiosyncratically higher levels of durability.
As we already discussed, if job loss increases the probability of divorce, even in families which are idiosyncratically stable, then our results are likely to have conservative lower bounds for the population at large. Table 10 presents results for the younger cohorts sample. Again we estimate probit model and random effect model for our base specification. Man's dismissal and temporary job ending still increase the probability of divorce in the following year, while a redundancy does not have a significant effect. Moreover, these families seem less likely to dissolve, the more children they have and working women seem less likely to divorce in this sample.
These results can be interpreted by observing the general characteristics of the sample and coming back to the recent findings of family economics. As we discussed before, the main impact of redundancy comes from the income shock and the financial stress on both partners. These elements are likely to be less important if the female partner in the couple is working and this sample is definitively characterised by a higher percentage of more educated women, active in the labour force. Moreover, we have already said that recent findings in family economics have shown that more educated women are less likely to dissolve their marriage and this can partially explain the negative sign of the woman's employment binary indicator, especially if we assume that more educated women are more likely to be employed.
On the other hand, the incidence of dismissal is identical to previous results and this confirms the importance of the signalling role of this type of job loss.
Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper we have examined the effect of job loss on partnership dissolution using data from the British Household Panel Survey. Using information from employment histories, we distinguish different job changes (dismissal, redundancy and temporary job ended) and we analyze the impact of these types of job losses the probability of divorce in the year following the displacement. In this paper, we focus on the effects of a job loss experienced by the husband. (A further development will be the consideration of the effects of the wife's job losses.) Redundancies measure exogenous job losses and hence capture effects from the income shock rather than new information on the quality of the partner.
Job losses can affect marital stability through various channels. Previous empirical work on this issue is sparse and show contradictory results. A job loss can create an immediate earnings' shock that reduces the relative benefits of marriage/cohabitation and imposes pecuniary and nonpecuniary stress on the relationship. It also could be providing information on the expected future quality of the partner and the match generally. Our results to date show that job losses raise the probability of divorce in the following year by a statistically significant degree. Although the effects are generally significant for all three types of displacement, the magnitude of the effects varies. The largest effect is found for dismissals (a one to two percentage point increase in the probability of divorce) followed by temporary jobs ending and finally redundancies (0.3 to 0.7 percentage point increases in divorce). Our results suggest that both channels of transmissionincome shocks and the informational content of the job loss episode -affect the probability of family dissolution. This supports results by Eliason (2004) for Sweden rather than those of Charles 10 -Couples married after the beginning of the survey-Estimated coefficients and marginal effects (ME) on probability of divorce (standard errors in parenthesis). PROBIT PROBIT ME RE PROBIT RE PROBIT ME
